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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5839
This paper investigates the impact of remittances on 
financial inclusion. This is an important issue given 
recent studies showing that financial inclusion can 
have significant beneficial effects on households. Using 
household-level survey data for El Salvador, the authors 
examine the impact of remittances on households’ use 
of savings and credit instruments from formal financial 
institutions. They find that although remittances have a 
This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of 
a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at mmartinezperia@worldbank.org.  
positive impact on financial inclusion by promoting the 
use of deposit accounts, they do not have a significant 
and robust effect on the demand for and use of credit 
from formal institutions. If anything, by relaxing credit 
constraints, remittances might reduce the need for 
external financing from financial institutions, while at the 
same time increasing the demand for savings instruments. 
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I.  Introduction 
Remittances have become a significant source of external financing for developing countries. 
They reached US$307 billion in 2009, more than double the amount of official development 
assistance and over two-thirds of the private capital flows received by developing countries in 
that year. Remittances are especially significant for small developing countries neighboring large 
rich economies. For example, remittances account for approximately 17 percent of GDP in the 
case of El Salvador and they represent the second most important source of external flows after 
exports. 
There is an extensive literature on the effects of remittances on growth, investment in 
microenterprises, poverty, inequality, health, and education
1. However, there are not many 
studies that address the effects of international remittances on the domestic financial system. 
This question is important because the literature has shown that financial development can have 
a significant impact on economic growth and poverty reduction (King and Levine, 1993; Beck, 
Levine, and Loayza, 2000; and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2004).  
Furthermore, there is evidence that promoting financial inclusion – facilitating 
households’ access to and use of financial services – can also have significant beneficial effects. 
Based on a randomized evaluation of a microcredit program in India, Banerjee et al. (2010) find 
that access to microcredit leads to greater investment in business durables, increases the number 
of businesses started, and improves the profitability of existing ones. Karlan and Zinman (2010) 
conduct a field experiment in which a finance company randomly liberalized screening criteria 
on consumer loans in South Africa and find significant positive effects of access to credit on 
consumption, economic self-sufficiency (measured by employment status and income), and some 
                                                           
1 For a thorough review of the literature on the economics of remittances see Rapoport and Docquier (2006). Studies 
investigating the effects of remittances on growth include: Caceres and Saca (2006), Mundaca (2008), and Giuliano 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2009). Massey and Parrado (1998), Woodruff and Zenteno (2001 and 2007), Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp (2002), Mesnard (2004), and Woodruff (2007) examine the impact of remittances on investments in 
microenterprises. The literature on the effects of remittances on poverty includes: Adams (2004 and 2006), Adams 
and Page (2005), Taylor et al. (2005), and Acosta et al. (2007). Studies on the impact of remittances on inequality 
include Adams (1992), Taylor and Wyatt (1996), and McKenzie and Rapoport (2007). Kanaiaupuni and Donato 
(1999), Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005), Lopez Cordova (2005), and Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007) analyze the 
effects of remittances on health and mortality, while Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003), Hanson and Woodruff (2003), 
Lopez Cordova (2005), Yang (2005), and Acosta et al. (2007) investigate the impact on education.     3 
 
aspects of mental health and outlook.
2 Studies on the impact of accessing and using savings 
products also find positive effects. In particular, the literature has found that providing 
individuals access to savings instruments increases savings (Aportela, 1999, Ashraf et al., 
2010
3), female empowerment (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2010), productive investment (Dupas 
and Robinson, 2009), and consumption (Dupas and Robinson, 2009 and Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 
2010).   
Using household-level survey data for El Salvador for the period 1995-2001, this study 
investigates the impact of remittances on financial inclusion. In particular, we focus on whether 
remittances promote the use of deposit accounts and credit by examining the impact of 
remittances on the likelihood that households have a deposit account, apply for loans, and 
receive loans from formal financial institutions.  
There are several ways in which remittances could affect financial inclusion. First, 
remittances might increase the demand for savings instruments. The fixed costs of sending 
remittances make the flows lumpy, providing households with excess cash for some period of 
time. This might potentially increase their demands for deposit accounts, since financial 
institutions offer households a safe place to store this temporary excess cash. Second, 
remittances might increase household’s likelihood of obtaining a loan. Processing remittances 
flows provides financial institutions with information on the income of recipient households. 
This information might make financial institutions better willing and able to extend loans to 
otherwise opaque borrowers. On the other hand, since remittances might help relax households’ 
financing constraints, the demand for credit might fall as remittances increase.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are only three papers that examine the direct link 
between remittances and the domestic financial system. Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Martínez Pería (2011) study the impact of remittances on the financial sector using balance of 
payments data on remittances and aggregate data on bank credit and deposit amounts for 109 
developing countries over the period 1975-2007. They find strong evidence indicating that 
                                                           
2 Other studies that find that microcredit increases consumption or income include Pitt and Khandker (1998) and 
Khandker (2005). However, Roodman and Morduch (2009) are unable to reproduce those results. 
3 Ashraf et al. (2010) show that giving migrants from El Salvador access to bank accounts that allow them to have 
control over the funds they remit results in an increase in savings. 4 
 
remittances promote financial development, measured by the ratio bank deposits to GDP, and the 
share of bank credit to GDP. Gupta et al. (2009) use a similar methodology as Aggarwal et al. 
and find analogous results for a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries. Focusing exclusively 
on Mexico and using municipality-level data, Demirgüç-Kunt, Lopez-Cordova, Martínez Pería, 
and Woodruff (2011) find that municipalities where a higher proportion of households receive 
remittances have a higher number of bank branches and accounts per capita, and larger shares of  
deposits to GDP.  
Our paper contributes to the study of the impact of remittances on the financial sector in 
several ways. First, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the impact of remittances 
on financial inclusion directly. While previous studies have looked at the link between 
remittances and aggregate deposits and credit amounts, this is the first study to examine whether 
remittances foster the use of deposit accounts and credit by households. This is important given 
the literature that has identified beneficial effects from financial inclusion. Second, by looking at 
whether households apply for loans, this study is able to examine the impact of remittances on 
the demand for credit and not purely on credit outcomes. This is useful because it can allow us to 
begin to assess to what extent remittances might relax credit constraints. Third, by using 
household-level panel data, this study can circumvent some of the limitations of the previous 
studies. In particular, the survey data used in this study has the potential to capture remittances 
flows received through formal and informal channels, minimizing concerns about measurement 
error in remittances.
4 Also, because we use household-level panel data we are able to control for 
unobserved household characteristics that can affect both remittances and financial inclusion, 
something that was not possible in the earlier studies. Finally, our study offers evidence on the 
impact of remittances on financial inclusion for a new country - El Salvador – for which 
remittances represent a very significant share of GDP. 
We conduct probit estimations of the likelihood of using deposit and credit services, 
allowing for department-, municipality-, or household-level fixed effects to control for factors 
other than remittances that might affect financial inclusion at the household level.
5 Also, to deal 
                                                           
4 This is a significant concern in the study by Aggarwal et al. (2011) that uses balance of payment data on 
remittances. 
5 El Salvador is divided into 14 departments and 262 municipalities. 5 
 
with the potential endogeneity of remittances, we conduct instrumental variables regressions. 
Our main instruments are economic conditions in US states where Salvadoran migrants reside. 
Our estimations show that households that receive remittances are more likely to have a 
deposit account at a financial institution. Our most conservative estimates indicate that receiving 
remittances increases the likelihood of having an account by at least 11 percent and an additional 
colon per capita in remittances raises this probability by 5 percent. These effects are sizeable 
given that on average only 19 percent of households have an account. However, remittance-
recipient households are not more prone to request or receive a loan. In fact, some estimations 
show the opposite. This suggests that though remittances might have the potential to encourage 
the use of savings instruments, they do not necessarily foster the demand for and use of credit, 
perhaps because they help to relax credit constraints.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II characterizes the Salvadoran 
banking system during our period of study. Section III describes the data and the empirical 
methodology we employ. Section IV presents the results of our estimations. Section V 
concludes. 
II.  The Salvadoran financial system during the late 1990s 
El Salvador’s financial system witnessed a number of reforms during the 1990s.  In the late 
1980s, during the final years of the civil war, the banking system became largely insolvent. 
Trying to overcome that situation, in 1989, the Salvadoran government adopted a reform plan 
with the aim of increasing competition and efficiency. In this process, several laws were passed 
allowing the privatization of banks, removing restrictions on foreign bank entry, and establishing 
new supervision rules. As a consequence of these reforms and due to good macroeconomic 
performance, there was a considerable increase in the depth and the size of the financial system 
(see Fuentes 2001).  As shown in Table 1, from 1991 to 2001, the ratio of bank and non-bank 
credit to the private sector expressed as a share of GDP increased from 23 percent to 39 percent, 
while the ratio of demand and term deposits to GDP rose from 24 percent to 36 percent. The 
number of banks and non-bank institutions did not change significantly during the period: there 
were 14 institutions that were allowed to collect deposits in 2001, only one more than in 1991.  6 
 
The Salvadoran banking sector became one of the deepest in Central America
6 by the end 
of the 1990s (see Figure 1). However, despite the financial reforms undertaken during this 
decade,  financial inclusion remained low in El Salvador. Based on a survey of rural households, 
conducted by FUSADES (Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development), 8.7 
percent of households had a deposit account as of 1995 and 6.8 percent had a loan from a formal 
financial institution.  
III.  Data and empirical methodology 
The household-level data we use in this study come from the National Rural Household Survey 
carried out by FUSADES in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. All the information gathered by each 
survey refers to the previous calendar year. The survey uses a questionnaire adapted from the 
World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey and covers a stratified, nationally 
representative, random sample of rural households. The four waves contain information for about 
937 households dispersed across the 14 departments that make up El Salvador. Within our 
sample, 719 households are present in more than 1 wave and 451 households have data for the 
four waves, allowing us to construct a panel.  
The survey includes data on demographic characteristics, education, employment, 
economic activities, wealth, and income of households. With respect to migration, the survey has 
information on the number of members per household that have migrated to other countries, their 
kinship relationship or role in the household (i.e. head of household, spouse, son), the time they 
have been abroad, and the year they came back to El Salvador in case they returned. Moreover, 
data on whether the individuals that migrated sent remittances and the amount sent are also 
available. 
The survey also contains information on households’ use of financial services offered by 
formal financial institutions (i.e., commercial banks, cooperatives, credit unions, and other 
financial institutions), development institutions (i.e., NGOs), and informal sources (i.e. stores, 
friends, employers). In this study, we focus on formal financial institutions in order to analyze 
the impact of remittances on access to financial services such as loans, savings, and checking 
                                                           
6 Central America includes the following countries: Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 7 
 
accounts. Table 1 shows the summary statistics and descriptions of the variables we employ in 
our analysis. 
In order to investigate the impact of remittances on financial inclusion, we estimate the 
following model: 
Financial inclusionit=α+β1Remittancesit + β2Income/Wealthit + β3Educationit + 
β4Returned migrantit + β5Other household characteristicsit +εit  (1) 
Where i denotes households, t denotes time.  Financial inclusion refers to three different 
alternative dependent dummy variables indicating: (i) whether the household has a deposit 
account at a formal financial institution; (ii) whether any member of the household has applied 
for a loan from a financial institution; and (iii) whether the household has received a loan from a 
financial institution. Considering the whole sample, on average, 19 percent of the households 
have a deposit account, whereas 7 percent of households asked for a loan from a formal financial 
institution, and 6 percent received a loan in our sample. Given that our three dependent variables 
are binary, we conduct probit estimations of equation (1). 
Remittances refers to either the per capita real amount of remittances that a household 
received in a given year or a dummy variable indicating whether the household received 
remittances from abroad. In the survey, information on remittances sent is reported for each 
member living abroad. For those households with more than one migrant, we compute the total 
amount of remittances by summing the remittances sent by all the members residing overseas. 
We then divide this sum by the number of household members to get the per capita data. The 
remittances dummy variable equals one when the sum of remittances flows to a household is 
different from zero. On average, 20 percent of households received remittances in our sample 
and the average per capita real amount of remittances received is 280 colones or 32 dollars (in 
1995 prices).  
Given that a household’s income and wealth could have a direct influence on financial 
inclusion, a number of variables proxying for the income and wealth of the household are 
included in the estimations. In particular, Income/Wealth represents two different variables: (i) 
the real income per capita of the household, and (ii) a dummy indicating whether the household 8 
 
owns its house and land. The household income is computed taking the sum of the amounts that 
every household member living in El Salvador earns from agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities, interests, dividends, or pensions. As in the case of remittances, we divide by the 
number of household members to compute the per capita income. Taking the average across the 
four surveyed years, the average per capita real income (in 1995 prices) is 2,510 colones or 
approximately 287 dollars. The percentage of households that own their land and house equals 
68 percent.  
To allow for the possibility that financially literate households are more likely to use 
financial services, we include a proxy for financial literacy in our regressions. In particular, 
Education denotes the average number of years of education completed by adult household 
members. We consider as adult members individuals that are 18 years old or older. Taking the 
whole sample, the adults’ average number of years of education completed is 3.51. 
Some migrants might come back to El Salvador after a period. Those migrants might 
have experience using financial services abroad and, hence, households with a returned migrant 
might have higher demand for such services. We include Returned migrant to control for this 
possible channel that could potentially affect financial inclusion. The mentioned variable is a 
dummy that equals one when a household has at least one member that has returned from living 
abroad.  Our sample indicates that 4 percent of the households have at least one member that 
came back from a foreign country. 
Finally, we consider a number of additional household characteristics as controls. In 
particular,  Other household characteristics include a dummy for whether members of the 
household are engaged in agricultural activities (labeled Agriculture in our tables) and a dummy 
variable for whether the household has access to electricity (labeled Electricity in our tables). We 
determine that a household is engaged in agricultural activities when at least one member works 
in any of those activities in a given year. We expect a positive relationship between Agriculture 
and the probability of holding an account, requesting, or receiving a loan. Households that are 
engaged in agricultural activities might have more volatile incomes and, hence, have a higher 
demand for financial services aiming to smooth their income path. Electricity provides 
information on household’s wealth, since wealthier households tend to have electric energy, but 9 
 
it is also used as a proxy for household’s proximity to large cities or towns. Households that are 
closer to big cities are more likely to be near financial institutions.
7 Hence, we expect a positive 
relationship between electricity and our dependent variables. Based on the complete sample, 65 
percent of households have electricity and the percentage of households with at least one 
member that worked in any agricultural activity equals 87 percent.  
We run the three versions of equation 1 considering the likelihood of having an account, 
applying for a loan, and obtaining a loan as the dependent variables, respectively. We include 
fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics that might affect the link between 
remittances and the use of financial services. In particular, we allow for three different types of 
fixed effects with decreasing levels of aggregation: (i) department fixed effects, (ii) municipality 
fixed effects, and (iii) household fixed effects.  
An important concern regarding the interpretation of the results of equation 1 is that they 
could be affected by endogeneity as a result of reverse causation. There are at least two reasons 
why endogeneity could arise. First, access to financial services from financial institutions might 
reduce the costs of remittances and, hence, might make migrants more prone to send and 
households to receive remittances. Second, financial institutions could finance migration, and, 
consequently, increase the remittance flow towards households with access to credit. We run 
instrumental variables regressions to deal with the potential endogeneity problem.  
Our main instruments are municipality-level weighted average measures of economic 
conditions in US states where Salvadoran migrants reside.
8 In particular, we focus on real GDP 
per capita and poverty rates in US states during 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001.
9 For each 
municipality in El Salvador, we identify the main US destinations for Salvadoran migrants using 
data on migration patterns for Salvadorans from the North American Integration and 
Development Center (NAID).
10 We then construct, for each Salvadoran municipality, a weighted 
                                                           
7 Our survey measures the distance to the closest bank office, but only for the last two waves: 1999 and 2001. We 
find that Electricity has a negative correlation with the distance to the closest bank (-0.13) and is significant at 1 
percent.  
8 We follow McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), who in their study of the impact of migration on income inequality in 
Mexico, use economic conditions in the US as one of their instruments for migration from Mexico. 
9 Appendix 1 describes other instruments we tried. Our main findings are not affected by our choice of instruments. 
10 The mentioned database is available at  http://gis.ats.ucla.edu/naid/. The NAID gathered information on the main 
destinations in the US of Salvadoran migrants during the last five years. We assume that migration patterns during 10 
 
average of economic conditions in US states where migrants from that municipality reside by 
weighing economic conditions in each US state according to the share of migrants from that 
municipality in El Salvador that reside in each US state. Hence, for every municipality j and year 
t the instruments are constructed as follows: 








where: i represents every US state, RealGDPpcit  and Povertyit are the real GDP per capita and 
poverty rates in US state i and year t, respectively. wji is the share of migrants from municipality 
j in El Salvador (out of the total migrants from that municipality) residing in state i in the US. 
The basic intuition for why we use these variables as instruments is that we think that economic 
conditions in US states will affect the ability of migrants to send remittances back to their 
communities in El Salvador, but these variables are unlikely to directly influence the use of 
financial services by households back in El Salvador.  
IV.  Results 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the estimation results (marginal effects) of the probit regressions for 
the likelihood of having a deposit account, receiving a loan, and applying for a loan, 
respectively. Each table shows two sets of estimations: including the remittances dummy 
variable (columns (1)-(4)) and, separately, the per capita real amount of remittances (column (5)-
(8)). For each measure of remittances, we conduct different estimations, depending on whether 
we include fixed effects and if so at what level of aggregation. The first column of each set does 
not employ any fixed effects, the second controls for department fixed effects, the third includes 
municipality fixed effects, and the fourth allows for household fixed effects. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the last five years are similar to those at the time of our household surveys. In the case of Mexico, Hildebrandt and 
McKenzie (2005) show that the historic migration rates are a strong predictor of current migration rates. 11 
 
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the impact of remittances on the likelihood that a 
household has a deposit account. The results indicate that in all model specifications both the 
remittances dummy and the amount of remittances per capita are statistically significant and 
positive. Furthermore, both variables have economically large effects. Receiving remittances 
increases the probability that the household will have a deposit account by between 11 and 30 
percent, depending on the type of fixed effects included. Furthermore, an additional colon per 
capita in remittances raises the likelihood of having an account by between 5 and 14 percent. 
These effects are sizeable considering that in the sample 19 percent of households have deposit 
accounts. 
As expected, Real per capita income and House and land ownership are also significant 
and positive: more income and wealth make households more prone to having an account. 
However, House and land ownership is not significant in the household fixed effects regressions 
in columns 4 and 8. Adults average education is positive and significant in all cases, whereas 
Returned migrant has the expected positive sign and is significant in all models except the one 
that controls for household fixed effects. Concerning the variables included in Other household 
characteristics, Agriculture does not seem to be significant, but we do find a significant positive 
coefficient for Electricity in all specifications.  
The results for the likelihood of receiving a loan from a formal financial institution are 
shown in Table 4. In contrast with the results in Table 3, the remittances variables are generally 
not significant.  These results could be driven by the fact that there are potentially two opposing 
effects of remittances on credit: (1) remittances can be used as an informal type of collateral or 
as a means to provide information on households’ income that might make financial institutions 
more willing to provide credit; and (2) remittances may help relax households’ credit constraints 
and, hence, could reduce their demand for credit. Thus, these two effects may well be 
counteracting each other, causing remittances to be generally insignificant.  
We find evidence in Table 4 indicating that Adults average education has a positive and 
significant influence on the probability of receiving a loan. This result holds in all model 
specifications, except the one that includes household fixed effects. We also find some evidence 
of a positive effect of House and land ownership, but this relationship is only significant at 5 12 
 
percent in the model that employs department fixed effects. Electricity shows significant 
coefficients for the model with department and municipality fixed effects. Returned migrant is 
positive and significant in the household fixed effects estimations.  
Table 5 shows that remittances tend to reduce the demand for credit from financial 
institutions. This is consistent with the notion that remittances might help relax households’ 
credit constrains, lowering their demand for loans. However, the coefficients on the remittances 
dummy and on the amount of remittances received are only significant in the regressions 
including municipality fixed effects. Adults average education and Electricity are significant in 
all models except the one with household fixed effects. The rest of our independent variables do 
not seem to be significant in explaining the demand for credit. 
As mentioned above, the results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 could be affected by endogeneity as 
a result of reverse causation. First, the presence of financial institutions may cause higher 
remittance flows, either because financial inclusion allows people to finance migration, and 
hence increases migration flows and remittances, or because financial inclusion is associated 
with lower costs of receiving remittances and, hence, a greater propensity to do so. Neither of 
these seems to be a first order concern. Financial institutions in El Salvador are an unlikely 
source of credit to finance migration. While access to financial services might facilitate receipt of 
remittances, the primary channel appears to be from migration to financial inclusion. We check 
this by running a regression where we replace the remittance dummy for a dummy which equals 
one for households with at least a member that is residing overseas. As shown in Table 6, results 
are nearly identical when we include the dummy for whether the household has a migrant 
member in place of the dummy for whether it receives remittances. Thus, the effect on the use of 
deposit accounts appears to be driven by migration, which causes remittance flows. 
Nevertheless, to try to assuage concerns about endogeneity, we run instrumental variables 
regressions. Our main instruments are municipality-level weighted averages of economic 
conditions in US states where Salvadoran migrants reside. In appendix 1, we also show 
estimations using migrant characteristics as instruments. In particular, we use information about 
the length of time that the migrants sending remittances have spent abroad and the closeness of 13 
 
the relationship of the migrants to the household.
11 However, because these variables are 
measured at the household level it is easier to think of arguments that can invalidate them as 
instruments. In particular, there could be a selection effect where the types of households that 
send migrants for longer periods of time or who send closer relatives abroad may differ in many 
ways from other households, including differing in financial access. Hence, though Table A.1 
and A.2 show that these instruments pass the exclusion restrictions and our main results are 
confirmed when using these instruments, we prefer to focus on what we think are likely to be 
more exogenous instruments: economic conditions in US states where Salvadoran migrants 
reside. 
Table 7A and 7B present the results of the first stage estimations where the likelihood of 
receiving remittances and the amount of remittances received per capita, respectively, are 
instrumented with the weighted average of real GDP per capita and/or the poverty rate for US 
states where Salvadoran migrants reside. We use these instruments separately and jointly.  Both 
in Tables 7A and 7B, the size of the Cragg-Donald F-statistics exceed the Stock and Yogo 
(2005) critical values, indicating that we do not have a weak instruments problem. 
We find that GDP per capita in US states has a positive effect on the likelihood that the 
household receives remittances (Table 7.A columns (1), (4) and (7)) and on the amount of 
remittances received (Table 7.B columns (1), (4) and (7)) when this variable is included on its 
own, without the poverty rate. In turn, the poverty rate has a negative impact on the likelihood 
that the household receives remittances (Table 7.A columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9)) and on 
the amount received (Table 7.B column (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9)), whether it is included on its 
own or together with GDP per capita.  
Table 8A and 8B show the second stage estimations where we instrument the likelihood 
of receiving remittances and the amount of remittances received per capita, respectively. We use 
the municipality level weighted GDP per capita for US states where migrants reside and the 
corresponding poverty rates individually and jointly as instruments. The overidentification tests 
reported in both tables 8A and 8B suggest that economic conditions in US states where 
                                                           
11 Following Rodriguez (1996), we expect the length of time spent by migrants abroad to have a non-linear inverted 
U shape relation to remittances and for remittances to increase with the closeness of the relationship of the migrant 
to the household. 14 
 
Salvadoran migrants reside are valid instruments (i.e., we cannot reject exogeneity of the other 
instrument conditional on one instrument being exogenous). 
We find that our main results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of 
remittances. Namely, while remittances have a positive effect on the likelihood that a household 
has a deposit account, neither the fact that a household receives remittances nor the actual per 
capita amount received has a statistically robust impact on the likelihood of applying for and 
receiving a loan. 
V.  Conclusion 
As the importance of remittances for developing countries has grown, a sizeable literature has 
flourished examining the impact of remittances on various aspects of countries’ development. An 
issue which has received little attention is the effect of remittances on the financial system. This 
issue is important given the evidence that financial development matters for growth and poverty 
alleviation and financial inclusion has many beneficial effects for households. 
This study examined the impact of remittances on financial inclusion using data from a 
four-wave rural household survey for El Salvador. In particular, we analyzed the impact of 
remittances on the likelihood that households use financial services such as deposit accounts and 
loans. Overall, we find that remittances have a positive impact on financial inclusion by 
promoting the use of deposit accounts. These results hold controlling for unobserved household 
characteristics and using instrumental variables regressions to correct for the potential 
endogeneity of remittances. On the other hand, remittances do not have a significant effect on 
credit from formal financing institutions.  Hence, we conjecture that by relaxing credit 
constraints, remittances might reduce the need for external financing by financial institutions, 
while at the same time increasing the demand for savings instruments. 
There are a number of potential avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting 
to analyze the extent to which remittance recipients that have accounts, actively use these 
accounts to save and manage their daily transactions. Second, it would be important to go deeper 
into the reasons why those that receive remittances do not seem to have a higher demand for 
credit. In particular, it would be useful to analyze whether indeed this is due to the fact that 15 
 
remittances relax credit constraints or because the credit products offered to remittance recipients 
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Table 1: Financial system indicators for El Salvador 
Year  Credit to private sector 
to GDP (%) 
Demand and term 
deposits to GDP (%) 
Number of 
institutions  
1991  23.4  23.8  13 
1992  27.5  25.7  13 
1993  27.7  28.4  13 
1994  30.9  31.1  17 
1995  34.8  29.9  21 
1996  36.9  31.3  21 
1997  40.3  32.6  18 
1998  41.9  33.2  17 
1999  43.8  34.4  16 
2000  41.4  34.0  15 
2001  39.0  36.0  14 
 
Source: Central Bank of El Salvador and Financial System Superintendency of El Salvador. 
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Table 2: Variable description and summary statistics 
 
Variable     Description     # Obs.  Mean  Std. 
dev. 
Deposit account    Dummy  variable.  Equals  one  if  the  household  has  a 
checking or savings account in a bank, cooperative, or 
other formal financial institution. 
  2503  0.19  0.39 
Loan received 
 
  Dummy variable. Equals one if the household received a 
loan from a formal financial institution. 
  2708  0.06  0.25 
Loan requested    Dummy variable. Equals one if the household requested 
a loan from a formal financial institution. 
  2717  0.07  0.26 
Remittances 
dummy 
  Dummy variable. Equals one if the household received 
remittances from overseas. 
  2741  0.20  0.40 
Remittances 
amount 
  Value of remittances per household member in real terms 
(thousands of colones). 
  2683  0.28  0.83 
Real per capita 
income 
  Household real per capita income (thousands of colones).    2572  2.51  2.52 
House and land 
ownership 
  Dummy Variable. Equals one if the household owns its 
house and land. 
  2503  0.68  0.47 
Adults average 
education 
  Average number of years of education of adults.    2742  3.51  2.73 
Agriculture    Dummy  Variable.  Equals  one  if  at  least  one  of  the 
household members worked in any agricultural activity. 
  2748  0.87  0.34 
Electricity    Dummy  variable.  Equals  one  if  the  household  has 
electric energy. 
  2504  0.65  0.48 
Returned migrant    Dummy variable. Equals one when the household has at 
least  one  migrant  that  has  returned  from  abroad  to  El 
Salvador. 
  2748  0.04  0.20 
Real GDP per 
capita in US states 
  Weighted average of real GDP per capita in US states 
where  Salvadoran  migrants  reside.  For  every 
municipality  j  and  year  t  the  weighted  real  GDP  per 
capita  is  constructed  as  follows:                 
 
   , 
where i represents US states and wji is the percentage of 
migrants from municipality j that lives in US state i. 
  2705  34.01  2.92 
Poverty in  
US states 
   Weighted average of the poverty rates in US states where 
Salvadoran migrants reside. For every municipality j and 
year t the weighted poverty rate is constructed as follows: 
               
 
  , where i represents US states and wji is 
the percentage of migrants from municipality j that lives 
in US state i. 








Table 3. Estimations for the likelihood that the household has a deposit account  
This table shows marginal effects from the estimations of a probit model. The dependent variable is 1 if the household has a deposit account with a formal financial 
institution and zero otherwise. All independent variables are defined in Table 1. In columns (1)-(4), the variable Remittances refers to a dummy for whether the household 
receives remittances from overseas, whereas in columns (5)-(8) Remittances refers to per capita amounts received in remittances from overseas. Robust z-statistics are 
shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
   Dependent variable: dummy for whether household has a deposit account 
Variables  Remittance:  dummy for whether household receives 
remittances from overseas     Remittances: the amount of remittances per 
capita received from overseas 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                    Remittances  0.109  0.126  0.143  0.291 
 
0.047  0.049  0.060  0.136 
 
[5.33]***  [5.82]***  [5.30]***  [4.64]*** 
 
[6.82]***  [6.96]***  [6.66]***  [4.93]*** 
Real per capita income  0.014  0.014  0.015  0.023 
 
0.014  0.014  0.015  0.025 
 
[5.28]***  [5.15]***  [4.96]***  [2.78]*** 
 
[5.27]***  [5.11]***  [4.70]***  [2.86]*** 
House and land ownership  0.043  0.045  0.047  0.091 
 
0.042  0.045  0.047  0.075 
 
[2.62]***  [2.74]***  [2.42]**  [1.12] 
 
[2.54]**  [2.71]***  [2.37]**  [0.90] 
Adults average education  0.025  0.024  0.029  0.033 
 
0.024  0.023  0.028  0.032 
 
[8.44]***  [8.09]***  [7.94]***  [2.40]** 
 
[8.11]***  [7.66]***  [7.64]***  [2.30]** 
Agriculture  -0.023  -0.016  -0.010  0.046 
 
-0.023  -0.017  -0.012  0.044 
 
[-1.02]  [-0.72]  [-0.37]  [0.78] 
 
[-1.02]  [-0.75]  [-0.48]  [0.73] 
Electricity  0.106  0.108  0.127  0.306 
 
0.103  0.105  0.123  0.295 
 
[6.13]***  [6.27]***  [6.06]***  [3.92]*** 
 
[5.97]***  [6.07]***  [5.82]***  [3.61]*** 
Returned migrant  0.090  0.090  0.114  0.168 
 
0.099  0.106  0.125  0.112 
 
[2.37]**  [2.37]**  [2.40]**  [1.17] 
 
[2.57]**  [2.71]***  [2.57]**  [0.76] 
                    Observations  2374  2374  2043  795 
 
2348  2348  2004  783 
Pseudo R
2  0.15  0.16  0.21  0.14 
 
0.16  0.17  0.22  0.15 
Log likelihood  -965.2  -951.6  -829.7  -460.3 
 
-939.9  -927.6  -807.6  -448.7 
Department fixed effects  No  Yes  No  No 
 
No  Yes  No  No 
Municipalities fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No 
 
No  No  Yes  No 
Household fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes     No  No  No  Yes 
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Table 4. Estimations for the likelihood that the household has a loan from a financial institution. 
This table shows marginal effects from the estimations of a probit model. The dependent variable is 1 if the household received a loan from a formal financial institution and 
zero otherwise. All independent variables are defined in Table 1. In columns (1)-(4), the variable Remittances refers to a dummy for whether the household receives 
remittances from overseas, whereas in columns (5)-(8) Remittances refers to per capita amounts received in remittances from overseas. Robust z-statistics are shown in 
brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
   Dependent variable: Dummy for whether household received a loan 
Variables  Remittances: dummy for whether household receives 
remittances from overseas     Remittances: the amount of remittances per 
capita received from overseas 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                    Remittances  -0.014  -0.006  -0.031  -0.086 
 
-0.008  -0.005  -0.014  -0.114 
 
[-1.13]  [-0.54]  [-1.59]  [-0.82] 
 
[-1.43]  [-1.13]  [-1.65]*  [-1.85]* 
Real per capita income  0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.020 
 
0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.017 
 
[0.58]  [0.71]  [0.67]  [-1.66]* 
 
[0.59]  [0.75]  [0.70]  [-1.29] 
House and land ownership  0.020  0.021  0.031  0.019 
 
0.020  0.022  0.032  0.015 
 
[1.85]*  [2.22]**  [1.88]*  [0.20] 
 
[1.88]*  [2.30]**  [1.93]*  [0.15] 
Adults average education  0.006  0.006  0.012  0.006 
 
0.006  0.006  0.013  0.004 
 
[3.30]***  [3.16]***  [3.71]***  [0.27] 
 
[3.38]***  [3.23]***  [3.92]***  [0.20] 
Agriculture  0.009  0.011  -0.012  -0.127 
 
0.009  0.011  -0.011  -0.147 
 
[0.62]  [0.91]  [-0.50]  [-1.12] 
 
[0.63]  [0.89]  [-0.45]  [-1.24] 
Electricity  0.017  0.019  0.034  -0.062 
 
0.018  0.020  0.035  -0.057 
 
[1.56]  [1.95]*  [1.87]*  [-0.60] 
 
[1.60]  [2.00]**  [1.87]*  [-0.55] 
Returned migrant  0.013  0.026  0.028  0.704 
 
0.017  0.031  0.036  0.747 
 
[0.54]  [1.07]  [0.67]  [4.64]*** 
 
[0.68]  [1.24]  [0.81]  [9.84]*** 
                    Observations  2347  2347  1365  372 
 
2321  2321  1354  362 
Pseudo R
2  0.03  0.06  0.11  0.09 
 
0.03  0.06  0.11  0.10 
Log likelihood  -545.8  -528.5  -421.9  -225.4 
 
-543.4  -526.5  -419.3  -217.2 
Department fixed effects  No  Yes  No  No 
 
No  Yes  No  No 
Municipalities fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No 
 
No  No  Yes  No 
Household fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes     No  No  No  Yes 
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Table 5. Estimations for the likelihood that the household has requested a loan from a financial institution 
This table shows marginal effects from the estimations of a probit model. The dependent variable is 1 if the household requested a loan from a formal financial institution 
and zero otherwise. All independent variables are defined in Table 1. In columns (1)-(4), the variable Remittances refers to a dummy for whether the household receives 
remittances from overseas, whereas in columns (5)-(8) Remittances refers to per capita amounts received in remittances from overseas. Robust z-statistics are shown in 
brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
   Dependent variable: Dummy for whether household requested a loan 
Variables  Remittances: dummy for whether household receives 
remittances from overseas     Remittances: the amount of remittances per 
capita received from overseas 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                    Remittances  -0.020  -0.011  -0.040  -0.044 
 
-0.011  -0.007  -0.021  -0.064 
 
[-1.58]  [-0.85]  [-1.97]**  [-0.45] 
 
[-1.80]*  [-1.42]  [-2.13]**  [-1.52] 
Real per capita income  0.001  0.002  0.002  -0.019 
 
0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.017 
 
[0.80]  [0.92]  [0.56]  [-1.70]* 
 
[0.82]  [0.95]  [0.59]  [-1.43] 
House and land ownership  0.018  0.019  0.028  -0.028 
 
0.018  0.020  0.028  -0.033 
 
[1.61]  [1.88]*  [1.61]  [-0.31] 
 
[1.62]  [1.95]*  [1.63]  [-0.36] 
Adults average education  0.006  0.006  0.011  0.019 
 
0.006  0.006  0.012  0.020 
 
[3.12]***  [2.97]***  [3.29]***  [0.97] 
 
[3.22]***  [3.06]***  [3.54]***  [1.01] 
Agriculture  0.010  0.013  -0.004  -0.072 
 
0.010  0.013  -0.003  -0.079 
 
[0.70]  [1.04]  [-0.16]  [-0.71] 
 
[0.70]  [1.02]  [-0.13]  [-0.75] 
Electricity  0.023  0.024  0.042  -0.059 
 
0.024  0.025  0.042  -0.046 
 
[1.99]**  [2.32]**  [2.23]**  [-0.62] 
 
[2.02]**  [2.37]**  [2.23]**  [-0.49] 
Returned migrant  0.019  0.032  0.038  0.258 
 
0.022  0.037  0.046  0.399 
 
[0.72]  [1.24]  [0.85]  [0.91] 
 
[0.84]  [1.39]  [1.02]  [1.21] 
                    Observations  2353  2353  1423  415 
 
2327  2327  1411  405 
Pseudo R
2  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.08 
 
0.03  0.06  0.11  0.09 
Log likelihood  -587.6  -567.3  -461.2  -251.4 
 
-584.9  -565.0  -458.3  -244.3 
Department fixed effects  No  Yes  No  No 
 
No  Yes  No  No 
Municipalities fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No 
 
No  No  Yes  No 
Household fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes     No  No  No  Yes 
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Table 6: Estimations for the likelihood of using deposit and credit services replacing remittances with migration 
This table shows marginal effects from the estimations of probit models. In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variable is 1 if the household has a deposit account. In 
columns (5)-(8), the dependent variable is 1 if the household received a loan and in columns (9)-(12) it is one if the household requested a loan and zero 
otherwise. Migrant refers to a dummy that equals one if the household has at least one member living overseas. All other independent variables are defined in 
Table 1. Robust z-statistics are shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Dummy for whether 
household has a deposit account 
Dependent variable: Dummy for whether 
household received a loan 
Dependent variable: Dummy for whether 
household requested a loan 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                         
Migrant  0.089  0.097  0.108  0.204  -0.012  -0.006  -0.022  -0.036  -0.015  -0.007  -0.024  0.000 
  [5.44]***  [5.86]***  [5.54]***  [4.13]***  [-1.10]  [-0.60]  [-1.35]  [-0.47]  [-1.40]  [-0.74]  [-1.43]  [-0.00] 
Real per capita income  0.013  0.013  0.015  0.024  0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.020  0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.019 
  [5.02]***  [4.87]***  [4.76]***  [2.83]***  [0.61]  [0.72]  [0.79]  [-1.64]  [0.85]  [0.93]  [0.68]  [-1.70]* 
House and land ownership  0.043  0.045  0.048  0.093  0.020  0.021  0.031  0.007  0.018  0.019  0.027  -0.040 
  [2.64]***  [2.76]***  [2.48]**  [1.16]  [1.85]*  [2.23]**  [1.84]*  [0.07]  [1.58]  [1.87]*  [1.52]  [-0.44] 
Adults average education  0.024  0.024  0.029  0.032  0.006  0.006  0.012  0.003  0.006  0.005  0.011  0.016 
  [8.38]***  [8.05]***  [7.95]***  [2.31]**  [3.28]***  [3.13]***  [3.68]***  [0.14]  [3.11]***  [2.94]***  [3.28]***  [0.83] 
Agriculture  -0.026  -0.019  -0.011  0.038  0.009  0.011  -0.010  -0.120  0.010  0.014  -0.002  -0.070 
  [-1.15]  [-0.86]  [-0.42]  [0.65]  [0.64]  [0.91]  [-0.45]  [-1.05]  [0.72]  [1.06]  [-0.09]  [-0.68] 
Electricity  0.109  0.111  0.133  0.321  0.017  0.019  0.033  -0.062  0.022  0.023  0.040  -0.058 
  [6.39]***  [6.52]***  [6.48]***  [4.26]***  [1.50]  [1.91]*  [1.82]*  [-0.61]  [1.89]*  [2.24]**  [2.12]**  [-0.62] 
Returned migrant  0.088  0.092  0.109  0.182  0.011  0.025  0.025  0.703  0.016  0.030  0.032  0.240 
  [2.36]**  [2.45]**  [2.30]**  [1.30]  [0.47]  [1.04]  [0.59]  [4.31]***  [0.62]  [1.18]  [0.73]  [0.87] 
                         
Observations  2380  2380  2046  796  2353  2353  1366  373  2359  2359  1424  416 
Pseudo R
2  0.146  0.157  0.211  0.139  0.026  0.057  0.111  0.088  0.024  0.058  0.102  0.081 
Log likelihood  -967.0  -954.4  -830.6  -463.4  -546.4  -529.0  -422.2  -226.1  -588.5  -567.9  -462.2  -252.1 
Department fixed effects  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Municipalities fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Household fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
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Table 7A: First stage estimations instrumenting the likelihood that the household receives remittances 
This table shows the results of the first stage regressions instrumenting the likelihood that the household receives remittances. The dependent variable is a 
dummy for whether the household received remittances. The instruments used are Real GDP per capita in US states and Poverty in US states defined in Table 1. 
Columns (1)-(3) are the first stage regressions for the likelihood that the household has a deposit account. Columns (4)-(6) are the first stage regressions for the 
likelihood of receiving a loan, while columns (7)-(9) show the first stage regressions for the likelihood of applying for a loan. All independent variables are 
defined in Table 1. Department fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Robust z-statistics are shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 
and 1 percent, respectively. 
Variables  Dependent variable: dummy for whether household receives remittances 








(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
(4)  (5)  (6) 
 
(7)  (8)  (9) 























Poverty in US states 
 
-4.445  -3.716 
   
-4.358  -3.889 
   
-4.387  -3.905 
   
[-7.41]***  [-3.99]*** 
   
[-7.23]***  [-3.15]*** 
   
[-7.28]***  [-3.21]*** 
Real per capita income  -0.005  -0.004  -0.004 
 
-0.006  -0.005  -0.005 
 
-0.006  -0.005  -0.005 
 
[-1.44]  [-1.31]  [-1.34] 
 
[-1.65]*  [-1.51]  [-1.53] 
 
[-1.62]  [-1.48]  [-1.50] 
House and land ownership  0.069  0.067  0.067 
 
0.070  0.068  0.069 
 
0.069  0.068  0.068 
 
[4.47]***  [4.35]***  [4.39]*** 
 
[4.54]***  [4.44]***  [4.46]*** 
 
[4.49]***  [4.38]***  [4.40]*** 
Adults average education  0.000  0.001  0.001 
 
0.002  0.002  0.002 
 
0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
[0.13]  [0.17]  [0.16] 
 
[0.45]  [0.50]  [0.49] 
 
[0.28]  [0.32]  [0.31] 
Agriculture  -0.007  -0.008  -0.008 
 
-0.005  -0.005  -0.006 
 
-0.005  -0.005  -0.006 
 
[-0.30]  [-0.32]  [-0.34] 
 
[-0.20]  [-0.23]  [-0.24] 
 
[-0.20]  [-0.23]  [-0.24] 
Electricity  0.090  0.096  0.094 
 
0.092  0.098  0.096 
 
0.092  0.097  0.096 
 
[5.56]***  [5.97]***  [5.80]*** 
 
[5.65]***  [6.05]***  [5.90]*** 
 
[5.62]***  [6.03]***  [5.88]*** 
Returned migrant  0.322  0.315  0.315 
 
0.326  0.319  0.319 
 
0.32  0.314  0.313 
 
[6.50]***  [6.33]***  [6.34]*** 
 
[6.57]***  [6.40]***  [6.40]*** 
 
[6.46]***  [6.30]***  [6.31]*** 
Constant  -0.668  0.540  0.309 
 
-0.660  0.524  0.373 
 
-0.607  0.572  0.419 
 
[-6.5]***  [6.06]***  [1.24] 
 
[-6.43]***  [5.83]***  [1.05] 
 
[-5.79]***  [6.07]***  [1.20] 
                        Observations  2315  2315  2315 
 
2287  2287  2287 
 
2293  2293  2293 
Wald test chi
2  1353.0  1332.0  1339.0 
 
57.3  62.8  61.6 
 
64.9  73.6  72.1 
Wald test p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 




Table 7B: First stage estimations instrumenting the per capita amount of remittances received 
This table shows the results of the first stage regressions instrumenting the per capita amount of remittances received. The dependent variable is the per capita 
amount of remittances received from overseas. The instruments used are Real GDP per capita in US states and Poverty in US states. Columns (1)-(3) are the first 
stage regressions for likelihood that the household has a deposit account. Columns (4)-(6) are the first stage regressions for the likelihood of receiving a loan, 
while columns (7)-(9) show the first stage regressions for the likelihood of applying for a loan.  All independent variables are defined in Table 1. Department 
fixed effects are estimated but not reported. Robust z-statistics are shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Variables  Dependent variable: per capita amount of remittances 
  Deposit account     Loan received     Loan requested 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 























Poverty in US states 
 
-8.509  -6.965 
   
-8.394  -7.389 
   
-8.387  -7.444 
   
[-5.43]***  [-3.30]*** 
   
[-5.31]***  [-2.27]** 
   
[-5.32]***  [-2.36]** 
Real per capita income  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007 
 
-0.009  -0.008  -0.008 
 
-0.009  -0.008  -0.008 
 
[-0.84]  [-0.75]  [-0.77] 
 
[-0.95]  [-0.86]  [-0.88] 
 
[-0.95]  [-0.86]  [-0.88] 
House and land ownership  0.115  0.111  0.112 
 
0.116  0.112  0.113 
 
0.117  0.113  0.114 
 
[2.86]***  [2.76]***  [2.78]*** 
 
[2.87]***  [2.78]***  [2.80]*** 
 
[2.90]***  [2.81]***  [2.83]*** 
Adults average education  0.010  0.011  0.011 
 
0.013  0.013  0.013 
 
0.011  0.011  0.011 
 
[1.11]  [1.14]  [1.13] 
 
[1.33]  [1.37]  [1.36] 
 
[1.19]  [1.22]  [1.22] 
Agriculture  -0.006  -0.007  -0.008 
 
-0.004  -0.005  -0.006 
 
-0.003  -0.005  -0.005 
 
[-0.10]  [-0.12]  [-0.13] 
 
[-0.07]  [-0.09]  [-0.10] 
 
[-0.06]  [-0.08]  [-0.09] 
Electricity  0.234  0.245  0.241 
 
0.234  0.245  0.242 
 
0.236  0.247  0.244 
 
[5.74]***  [6.11]***  [5.93]*** 
 
[5.68]***  [6.06]***  [5.77]*** 
 
[5.74]***  [6.12]***  [5.84]*** 
Returned migrant  0.668  0.657  0.656 
 
0.678  0.667  0.667 
 
0.665  0.654  0.654 
 
[4.02]***  [3.99]***  [3.98]*** 
 
[4.05]***  [4.02]***  [4.01]*** 
 
[4.01]***  [3.97]***  [3.97]*** 
Constant  -1.363  0.968  0.477 
 
-1.321  0.949  0.627 
 
-1.353  0.946  0.641 
 
[-4.6]***  [4.11]***  [0.83] 
 
[-4.31]***  [4.22]***  [0.63] 
 
[-4.53]***  [3.99]***  [0.66] 
                        Observations  2289  2289  2289 
 
2261  2261  2261 
 
2267  2267  2267 
Wald test chi
2  574.5  573.9  573.8 
 
57.9  64.9  62.6 
 
64.3  78.6  75.7 
Wald test p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cragg-Donald weak inst. F-stat  18.42  29.21  14.69     17.61  28.00  14.08     17.75  28.09  14.12 28 
 
Table 8A. Second stage regressions instrumenting the likelihood that the household receives remittances 
This table shows marginal effects from the estimations of a probit using instrumental variables. The variable being instrumented is the dummy for whether 
households receive remittances. The instruments used are Real GDP per capita in US states (columns (1), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (9)) and Poverty in US states 
(columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9)).  The dependent variables are dummy variables for whether the household has a deposit account (columns (1)-(3)), 
received a loan (columns (4)-(6)) and requested a loan (columns (7)-(9)). All independent variables and instruments are defined in Table 1. Department fixed 
effects are estimated but not reported. Robust z-statistics are shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Variables  Deposit account     Loan received     Loan requested 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
                        Remittances  0.779  0.778  0.778 
 
0.003  -0.053  -0.048 
 
-0.030  -0.072  -0.068 
 
[38.88]***  [38.47]***  [39.18]*** 
 
[0.03]  [-1.01]  [-0.85] 
 
[-0.40]  [-1.34]  [-1.20] 
Real per capita income  0.015  0.015  0.015 
 
0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
[4.33]***  [4.37]***  [4.36]*** 
 
[0.62]  [0.41]  [0.44] 
 
[0.75]  [0.58]  [0.60] 
House and land ownership  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
 
0.020  0.025  0.025 
 
0.020  0.025  0.024 
 
[-0.20]  [-0.17]  [-0.17] 
 
[1.86]*  [2.03]**  [1.98]** 
 
[1.64]  [1.83]*  [1.79]* 
Adults average education  0.020  0.021  0.021 
 
0.006  0.006  0.006 
 
0.006  0.006  0.006 
 
[4.93]***  [5.12]***  [5.12]*** 
 
[3.09]***  [2.96]***  [2.97]*** 
 
[2.87]***  [2.77]***  [2.78]*** 
Agriculture  -0.015  -0.015  -0.015 
 
0.012  0.013  0.013 
 
0.015  0.016  0.015 
 
[-0.57]  [-0.57]  [-0.56] 
 
[1.07]  [1.05]  [1.05] 
 
[1.20]  [1.18]  [1.18] 
Electricity  0.026  0.028  0.028 
 
0.019  0.027  0.026 
 
0.027  0.035  0.034 
 
[0.95]  [1.08]  [1.08] 
 
[1.42]  [1.87]*  [1.78]* 
 
[1.87]*  [2.20]**  [2.14]** 
Returned migrant   -0.142  -0.139  -0.139 
 
0.024  0.063  0.058 
 
0.046  0.083  0.079 
 
[-3.25]***  [-3.30]***  [-3.32]*** 
 
[0.46]  [0.97]  [0.90] 
 
[0.73]  [1.15]  [1.08] 
                        Instrument: Real GDP per capita in US states  Yes  No  Yes 
 
Yes  No  Yes 
 
Yes  No  Yes 
Instrument:  Poverty in US states  No  Yes  Yes 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2315  2315  2315 
 
2287  2287  2287 
 
2293  2293  2293 
Wald test chi
2  1353.0  1332.0  1339.0 
 
57.3  62.8  61.6 
 
64.9  73.6  72.1 
Wald test p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
Log likelihood  -1866  -1857  -1857 
 
-1452  -1447  -1447 
 
-1498  -1492  -1492 
Over-identification test chi
2  -  -  0.04 
 
-  -  2.08 
 
-  -  1.59 
Over-identification test p-value  -  -  0.85     -  -  0.15     -  -  0.21 
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Table 8B. Second stage estimations instrumenting the per capita amount of remittances received 
This table shows marginal effects from the estimations of a probit using instrumental variables. The dependent variables are dummy variables for whether the 
household has a deposit account (columns (1)-(3)), received a loan (columns (4)-(6)) and requested a loan (columns (7)-(9)). The variable being instrumented is 
the per capita amount of remittances received by households. The instruments used are Real GDP per capita in US states (columns (1), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (9)) 
and Poverty in US states (columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9)).  All independent variables and instruments are defined in Table 1. Department fixed effects are 
estimated but not reported. Robust z-statistics are shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Variables  Deposit account     Loan received     Loan requested 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
                        Remittances  0.361  0.360  0.360 
 
0.005  -0.035  -0.030 
 
-0.014  -0.052  -0.047 
 
[9.16]***  [10.30]***  [10.24]*** 
 
[0.10]  [-0.72]  [-0.56] 
 
[-0.28]  [-0.93]  [-0.80] 
Real per capita income  0.013  0.013  0.013 
 
0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
0.002  0.001  0.001 
 
[3.36]***  [3.38]***  [3.38]*** 
 
[0.67]  [0.50]  [0.53] 
 
[0.82]  [0.66]  [0.68] 
House and land ownership  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
0.021  0.025  0.025 
 
0.020  0.025  0.024 
 
[0.05]  [0.04]  [0.05] 
 
[2.03]**  [1.97]**  [1.90]* 
 
[1.69]*  [1.75]*  [1.69]* 
Adults average education  0.014  0.014  0.014 
 
0.006  0.007  0.006 
 
0.006  0.007  0.007 
 
[2.76]***  [2.90]***  [2.91]*** 
 
[3.10]***  [2.70]***  [2.67]*** 
 
[2.82]***  [2.58]***  [2.54]** 
Agriculture  -0.016  -0.016  -0.016 
 
0.012  0.013  0.013 
 
0.015  0.016  0.016 
 
[-0.64]  [-0.63]  [-0.63] 
 
[1.03]  [1.03]  [1.03] 
 
[1.17]  [1.15]  [1.15] 
Electricity  0.000  0.001  0.001 
 
0.018  0.029  0.027 
 
0.028  0.039  0.037 
 
[0.00]  [0.03]  [0.04] 
 
[1.24]  [1.64]  [1.49] 
 
[1.64]  [1.90]*  [1.76]* 
Returned migrant   -0.137  -0.137  -0.136 
 
0.023  0.067  0.061 
 
0.046  0.090  0.084 
 
[-2.58]***  [-2.75]***  [-2.73]*** 
 
[0.43]  [0.94]  [0.82] 
 
[0.69]  [1.11]  [1.00] 
                        Instrument: Real GDP per capita in US states  Yes  No  Yes 
 
Yes  No  Yes 
 
Yes  No  Yes 
Instrument:  Poverty in US states  No  Yes  Yes 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2289  2289  2289 
 
2261  2261  2261 
 
2267  2267  2267 
Wald test chi
2  574.5  573.9  573.8 
 
57.9  64.9  62.6 
 
64.3  78.6  75.7 
Wald test p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
Log likelihood  -4005  -3999  -3999 
 
-3596  -3593  -3593 
 
-3645  -3642  -3642 
Over-identification test chi
2  -  -  0.01 
 
-  -  2.21 
 
-  -  1.70 
Over-identification test p-value  -  -  0.94     -  -  0.14     -  -  0.19 30 
 
Figure 1: Private credit to GDP in Central America (average 1995-2001) 
 
Source: Central American Executive Secretariat of the Monetary Council and Central Bank of El Salvador. 
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Appendix 1: Instrumental variable estimations using migrants’ characteristics  
We employ three different variables related to migrants’ characteristics as alternative 
instruments for remittances:  Average time abroad, Average time abroad
2 and Kinship 
relationship. The variable Average time abroad denotes the average time spent abroad by the 
household members who migrated. For each member of the household residing abroad, the 
survey details the time spent in a foreign country. We take the average time across all members 
overseas for those households with more than one person living in a foreign country. Following 
the results of Rodriguez (1996) and Aggarwal and Horowitz (2002), we expect a positive 
influence of time abroad on remittances. The rationale is that migrants might take some time to 
settle in the host country before they start sending remittances. However, as Rodriguez (1996) 
asserts, the flow of remittances could decrease due to long absences. Hence, we expect an 
inverted U relationship between Average time abroad and both the amount of remittances and 
the likelihood of receiving remittances. Hence, we include Average time abroad
2 – the square of 
Average time abroad -  to allow for this possibility
 12   
Kinship relationship is an index that measures how close the kinship relationship between 
the migrants and the household is. The mentioned index equals 2 if at least one of the migrants is 
a member of the nuclear family (i.e., head of household, spouse or son); equals 1 when the 
household has relatives living abroad, but none of them are members of the nuclear family; and 
equals 0 when the household does not have any member living abroad. Based on the results of 
Rodriguez (1996), we expect the chances of receiving remittances to be higher if the migrants are 
members of the nuclear family. 
Table A1 presents the results of the first stage regressions using as instruments Average 
time abroad, Average time abroad
2 and Kinship relationship. These variables are significant and 
have the expected signs: Average time abroad shows an inverted U relationship with remittances, 
and Kinship relationship has a positive coefficient.  In order to test the relevance of our 
                                                           
12 Rodriguez  (1996)  analyzes  the  determinants  of  remittances  flows  to  Philippines  using  a  survey  of  overseas 
workers carried out in 1991. He finds an inverted U relationship between the time spent away and: (i) the decision to 
remit, and (ii) the remittance amounts. He also shows that remittances tend to be higher when the migrant is part of 
the nuclear family. Aggarwal and Horowitz (2002) investigate the migrants’ motivations to remit using data from 
Guyana for 1992 and 1993. They find that households that spent more than one year abroad are more prone to send 
remittances. 32 
 
instruments, we present the results of the Cragg-Donald weak instruments test. The tests show 
that the null hypothesis that the proposed instruments are redundant is rejected in all cases. 
The second stage regressions are shown in Table A2. In this table, we also test for the 
validity of instruments using the Amemiya-Lee-Newey over-identification test. The null 
hypothesis of no-correlation between the instruments and the error term is accepted in all 
estimations. Hence, these results suggest that we are employing suitable instruments.  
The instrumental variables results using migrant characteristics confirm what we found in 
the previous estimations: remittances have a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
having a savings or checking account. However, the impact on the likelihood of having or asking 
for a loan is not significant as before.  33 
 
Table A.1. First stage instrumental variables regressions using migrants’ characteristics 
This table shows the results of the first stage regressions of the instrumental variables estimations using migrants’ 
characteristics as instruments. The instruments used are Average time abroad, Average time abroad
2, and Kinship 
relationship. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the household received remittances. 
In columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the per capita amount of remittances received from overseas. Columns 
(1) and (4) are the first stage estimations for the likelihood that the household has a deposit account. Columns (2) 
and (5) are the first stage regressions for the likelihood of receiving a loan, while columns (3) and (6) shows the first 
stage estimations for the likelihood of applying for a loan. Department fixed effects are estimated but not reported.  
Robust z-statistics are shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  












Dependent variable: dummy equal 1 if 
household receives remittances    
Dependent Variable: per capita 
amount of remittances received  
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
(4)  (5)  (6) 
Average time abroad  0.035  0.034  0.034 
 
0.066  0.069  0.066 
 
[3.27]***  [3.15]***  [3.21]*** 
 
[2.16]**  [2.24]**  [2.14]** 
Average time abroad 
2  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
 
-0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
 
[-2.93]***  [-2.84]***  [-2.88]*** 
 
[-2.21]**  [-2.34]**  [-2.20]** 
Kinship relationship  0.367  0.368  0.367 
 
0.691  0.688  0.693 
 
[19.08]***  [18.91]***  [18.94]*** 
 
[10.73]***  [10.58]***  [10.66]*** 
Real per capita income  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004 
 
-0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
 
[-1.50]  [-1.60]  [-1.57] 
 
[-0.47]  [-0.48]  [-0.50] 
House and land ownership  0.019  0.020  0.019 
 
0.033  0.034  0.035 
 
[1.85]*  [1.93]*  [1.88]* 
 
[0.95]  [0.95]  [1.00] 
Adults average education  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
0.011  0.012  0.011 
 
[0.24]  [0.42]  [0.32] 
 
[1.36]  [1.45]  [1.37] 
Agriculture  -0.012  -0.009  -0.010 
 
-0.008  -0.006  -0.006 
 
[-0.84]  [-0.68]  [-0.71] 
 
[-0.17]  [-0.13]  [-0.13] 
Electricity  0.024  0.025  0.024 
 
0.130  0.127  0.129 
 
[2.10]**  [2.16]**  [2.11]** 
 
[3.65]***  [3.54]***  [3.60]*** 
Returned migrant  0.237  0.240  0.237 
 
0.542  0.550  0.541 
 
[5.11]***  [5.15]***  [5.12]*** 
 
[3.38]***  [3.39]***  [3.37]*** 
Constant  -0.018  -0.004  0.005 
 
-0.136  -0.193  -0.139 
 
[-0.76]  [-0.13]  [0.19] 
 
[-1.53]  [-2.22]**  [-1.55] 
                Observations  2122  2097  2103 
 
2098  2073  2079 
R
2  0.706  0.705  0.705     0.398  0.397  0.397 
Cragg-Donald F-stat  678.9  662.6  668.9     113.7  111.9  112.9 




Table A.2. Second stage instrumental variables regressions using migrants’ characteristics 
This table shows marginal effects from the estimations of a probit using instrumental variables. The instruments 
used are Average time abroad, Average time abroad 
2and Kinship relationship.  The dependent variables are dummy 
variables for whether the household has a deposit account (columns (1) and (4)), received a loan (columns (2) and 
(5)) and requested a loan (columns (3) and (6)). In columns (1)-(3), the variable Remittances refers to a dummy for 
whether the household receives remittances from overseas, whereas in columns (4)-(6) Remittances refers to per 
capita amounts received in remittances from overseas. Department fixed effects are estimated but not reported.  
Robust z-statistics are shown in brackets. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Variables  Remittances: dummy for whether 
household receives remittances   













(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
(4)  (5)  (6) 
Remittances  0.197  -0.015  -0.021 
 
0.084  -0.007  -0.011 
 
[5.92]***  [-1.10]  [-1.50] 
 
[6.27]***  [-0.79]  [-1.17] 
Real per capita income  0.013  0.000  0.000 
 
0.013  0.000  0.000 
 
[4.48]***  [-0.22]  [0.15] 
 
[4.48]***  [-0.19]  [0.17] 
House and land ownership  0.035  0.022  0.019 
 
0.033  0.022  0.020 
 
[2.08]**  [2.32]**  [1.87]* 
 
[1.95]*  [2.34]**  [1.91]* 
Adults average education  0.022  0.006  0.006 
 
0.021  0.007  0.006 
 
[7.12]***  [3.40]***  [3.07]*** 
 
[6.57]***  [3.49]***  [3.18]*** 
Agriculture  -0.026  0.008  0.010 
 
-0.027  0.007  0.009 
 
[-1.05]  [0.63]  [0.74] 
 
[-1.09]  [0.57]  [0.68] 
Electricity  0.099  0.015  0.021 
 
0.092  0.016  0.021 
 
[5.95]***  [1.50]  [1.93]* 
 
[5.42]***  [1.50]  [1.96]** 
Returned migrant  0.073  0.034  0.042 
 
0.078  0.037  0.046 
 
[1.69]*  [1.11]  [1.26] 
 
[1.79]*  [1.13]  [1.28] 
                Observations  2122  2097  2103 
 
2098  2073  2079 
Wald test chi
2  288.4  53.53  59.03 
 
289  53.08  58.42 
Wald test p-value  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00 
Log likelihood  -655.8  -284.4  -322.1 
 
-3291  -2910  -2954 
Over-identification test chi
2  0.79  1.66  1.90 
 
0.58  1.64  1.89 
Over-identification test p-value  0.67  0.44  0.39 
 
0.75  0.44  0.39 
           